No Olive Trees in Afghanistan: The Elusive Quest for Peace

Text: Vivianne LeBlanc
Photography: Sulaimen Hakemy

The tenth anniversary of the American-led intervention in Afghanistan occurred on October 7, 2011. Since the intervention began in 2001, billions of dollars in military, emergency relief, and development spending have been sunk into Afghanistan, a seemingly bottomless pit for foreign aid. Over the last ten years, the world has witnessed what is a fledgling state of democracy, security and socioeconomic development. While there have been some small (albeit reversible) wins such as heightened regional security and development initiatives in some areas, overall progress on the counterinsurgency campaign and Afghanistan’s development into a modern Westphalian state has been quite underwhelming.

Since the Americans announced in 2011 that they would withdraw from Afghanistan by 2014 and would now begin transferring security responsibilities to Afghan national forces (both the military and the police), a whole host of new problems have emerged. Regions that were previously considered stable in the northern and eastern parts of the country have been destabilised. The Taliban have been systematically targeting Afghan national security forces and Afghan governors to send a message to the Karzai government in Kabul that in spite of the past decade’s efforts at defeating the Taliban, the insurgency remains strong and influential throughout the country. Governors loyal to the Karzai government are also threatened, with several having been targeted and assassinated. Kabul – the capital city that generally maintains a more stable profile than other regions in the country, has seen a remarkable twist in the security situation. The attack on the British Council compound in August, in addition to the attack on the American Embassy in September, demonstrates that Afghanistan is not a stable environment and that the insurgency remains stronger than ever.

In spite of the ongoing insurgency, this is not to say that there have not been serious attempts at engaging the Taliban and other key stakeholders in peace processes. One such figure was Burhanuddin Rabbani, former leader of the Northern Alliance, and Afghanistan’s president from 1992 to 1996. He was the president and chief of the High Peace Council, and was heavily involved in the Afghan peace process. Rabbani was killed in his home in Kabul on September 20, 2011 by a man who said he had a message of peace from the Taliban, who moments later detonated a bomb hidden in his turban when he went to embrace him. The Taliban initially claimed responsibility for the attack, but retracted their statement the following day. The Haqqani Network is seen as a possible suspect, as well as Pakistan’s secret intelligence service, the ISI. Rabbani had been a controversial figure in Afghanistan; however in spite of any personal ambitions, he was in many ways a symbol of the Afghan peace process.

Since the killing of Rabbani, President Karzai has announced that his government will no longer hold peace talks with the Taliban. Has the killing of Rabbani put an end to any form of peace processes in Afghanistan? Will the Haqqani Network emerge as the new destabilising force in Afghanistan? With the transition of security responsibilities from NATO to Afghan national forces already well under way, what does this recent assassination mean for stabilisation and reconstruction in Afghanistan? This article will explore the impact Rabbani’s assassination may or may not have on the peace process in Afghanistan.

There is a common understanding in the field of international relations and conflict studies that in order to reach meaningful and enduring peace agreements, one needs to ensure that all of the parties to the conflict have a stake in the process and the outcome. Not only this, but participants in the negotiations ought to address the key, underlying grievances that have led to the state of instability. Of course, this is a difficult practice, proven by other failed attempts at peace efforts, from the Israel-Palestine conflict to Cyprus If Karzai is now saying he will no longer allow his government to engage with the Taliban on peace talks, does this entirely circumvent any previous attempts at peace and derail any previous successes?

Some reports seem to think that Rabbani’s death means the end of the peace process. Essentially, this argument suggests that Rabbani was the only figure that had the political influence and respect among the key stakeholders, particularly the Taliban and the Northern Alliance, who could move negotiations forward. On the other hand, it is important to entertain the notion that perhaps Rabbani was not as influential as these reports would have us believe. Many of his previous ‘negotiations’ with Taliban figures were actually found to be inconsequential, as his counterparts were in many cases either impostors or simply not senior enough in the organisation to be authoritative on the matter.

One must also consider how much appetite there is for peace negotiations in the first place. One important argument suggests that all of the moderate Taliban who are willing to negotiate with the Karzai administration and who want peace have already been actively engaged in peace processes. An excellent example of such a moderate is Mullah Abdul Salam Zaeef, previously the Taliban government’s ambassador to Pakistan. Zaeef claims that the Taliban are not interested in seats in government; he believes the Taliban have come together to bring an end to what they see as a foreign occupation by the US-NATO led operation. If that is indeed the case, it suggests that internal peace talks will do little in the way of bringing peace and stability to the fragile country. Thus, Karzai’s recent decision to cut any further discussions with the Taliban does little in the way of changing the current environment.

In his statement breaking off relations with the Taliban, Karzai also suggested his desire to improve bilateral relations with Pakistan. In many ways this is an important and strategic move. First of all, there are some reports that suggest that Rabbani’s killer was Pakistani, and that the attack was planned on Pakistani territory, in Quetta. Without delving into a great level of detail on the intricacies of regional insecurity and the range of militants in Central Asia, the point here is that Karzai may have a better chance of bringing peace to Afghanistan by engaging regional neighbours. Pakistan has always been involved in Afghanistan in some capacity, and the ISI has allegedly supported the Taliban, including providing them with safe havens in Pakistani territory. Pakistan obviously has a stake in Afghanistan’s development and stability, and it should be taken very seriously in any form of discussion on stabilisation, security and development in Afghanistan. There is a great deal of militancy in Pakistan, therefore if Afghanistan and Pakistan can cooperate on these matters, they may be more successful at securitising the more volatile militant or insurgent regions in their respective territories.

When studying the Afghan conflict and any potential peace processes, a number of competing variables need to be taken into account. First of all, it seems fairly clear from statements and actions from the Taliban that they are not willing to engage in serious and meaningful negotiations until the foreign forces have withdrawn from Afghanistan entirely. Secondly, Afghanistan needs to engage its neighbours in this process – porous borders with Pakistan have only strengthened the Taliban insurgency as well as other militant organisations that find refuge in the ungovernable tribal areas that line the border between the two countries. Ultimately, the death of Rabbani has not signaled an end to the peace process in Afghanistan; the peace process was never truly underway.

Vivianne LeBlanc studied her MA in Conflict, Security and Development at King’s College London, with a focus on South Asian security and development issues.