Text: Ridwan al-Makassary
Photography: Renalda Ludvika and Ridwan al-Makassary
In Indonesia demands to establish a state based on Shari’ah is often complemented by efforts to apply the Shari’ah as positive legislation. In the idea of applying the Shari’ah to a state level, Islamic intellectuals and politicians always point to the history of the Medina State during the Prophet’s lifetime, which they claim as the best example for an Islamic way of life.
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However, according to Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na’im, the concept Medina State which is projected by the Muslim hardliners is actually only valid in a specific historical context and its implementation was not in the form of positive legislation. Moreover, this special occurrence was never again replicated by any nation after the Prophet had died. In other words, the Medina State was based more on the moral authority of social compromise than on the coercive powers of the state. The key point is therefore that the Medina State model cannot be applied in any Muslim communal context. The history of the State of the Prophet is a unique phenomenon which ended with his death. Therefore, the claim to establish an Islamic State to force the implementation of the Shari’ah is unrealistic and manipulative.
Professor Coulson stresses in A History of Islamic Law that the Shari’ah known to Muslims is the product of a very slow, gradual, and spontaneous interpretation of the Qur’an as well as the collection, verification, and interpretation of the Sunnah during the first three centuries of Islam (7 – 9th century AD). This process took place between scholars and jurists (specialists on Islamic Law) who created their own methodology for the classification of numerous sources, deriving specific rules from general principles. The technical aspect of their labor is known as Ilmu Ushul Fiqh. We know that there are numerous differences of opinion (read: Mazhab) over many issues, even though the sources are the same: Qur’an and Sunnah.
To forcefully implement Shari’ah through the State is clearly invalid. Each effort to create an Islamic government will facilitate the creation of conditions of intimidation in a plural society, both between adherents to different mazhabs within the same religion as between believers of different religions. Why should it be like that? Because, if a ruling government mandates the implementation of a particular mazhab it will seek excuses if it does not agree with Shari’ah stipulations of a particular mazhab which, nota bene, forms an interpretation or the views of that mazhab. In this regard, it is assumed that anyone who does not follow the state’s official mazhab opposes Allah, and will be destroyed. Cases such as in Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan, Sudan, and Nigeria show political battles in the name of Shari’ah but appear to be negative and destructive.
Among the various substances of the Shari’ah the most important one (if we refer to the Qur’an) is the implementation of justice. The problem with the Shari’ah subsequently is how the state can provide justice for the people. When there is a just state that provides the needs of its people, the problem is not whether the state should be religious or secular. From a historical perspective there has never been a successful example of an Islamic State that applied the Shari’ah. The case of the Taliban in Afghanistan is an example that destroyed other parties who did not agree with them. Because of instances such as these, the Shari’ah should be enacted on a personal level, and not on the level of the state.
It is important to note that the concept of Medina as the model state is taken as axiomatic by supporters of the struggle for state implementation of Shari’ah. As already mentioned, the Medina model was only valid in the context of the moral authority of the Prophet, and had no validity in law. Thus Medina as a state was based more on the moral authority of social compromise than on the coercive power of government. In other words, the State established by the Prophet was a unique phenomenon, which ended with his death. The only conclusion can be is that the Medina State model cannot be applied in any other Muslim communal context.
Three groups emerge in Indonesia in response to the implementation and formalization of the Shari’ah by the state. One emerges from inside government circles, who enable a much restricted integration of the Shari’ah in the national law system. The second emerges from non-Muslim and Muslim circles who oppose the manifestation of the Shari’ah in positive legislation as they consider this a restriction of the principles of justice. The third emerges from hard-line Islamic groups who want the implementation of Shari’ah.
As long as mainstream Islam (Nahdhatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah) in Indonesia does not provide positive feedback for the idea of formalization of the Shari’ah through the creation of an Islamic State, the idea of the implementation of the Shari’ah remains utopian.
Ridwan al-Makassary is a Program Coordinator of Islam and Human Rights of the Center for the Study of Religion and Culture (CSRC) UIN Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta, Indonesia. He has also published a book: The Seeds of Radical Islam in Mosques.
Executive Summary
This book, “Benih-Benih Islam Radikal di Masjid” (“The Seeds of Radical Islam in Mosques”), presents the results of two field research programs carried out by the Center for the Study of Religion and Culture (CSRC) UIN Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta in 2008 and 2009. These were “Mapping the Ideology of Mosques in DKI Jakarta” and “Mapping the Ideology of Mosques in Solo.” The Jakarta based research took the form of a quantitative survey of some 250 mosques, while in Solo researchers used qualitative in-depth interviews and observations in ten mosques.
Both programs shared a common background – the phenomena of religious radicalism. Anecdotal evidence suggests that radical Islam has been growing steadily in Indonesia since the end of the Suharto regime in the late 1990s. This can be seen in the emergence of various Islamic hard-line groups such as Laskar Jihad, Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia, Front Pembela Islam, Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia, and several smaller militant groups in Solo, including Front Pemuda Islam Surakarta (FPIS) and Hizbullah dan Jundullah. The CSRC research confirmed the growth of radicalism represented by these groups by quantifying its spread in Jakarta and investigating its qualitative characteristics in Solo.
With only minor variations, these groups adhere to an Islamic salafi ideology. Their followers are fundamentalists, in that they strive to emulate the historical example of the Prophet Muhammad SAW and his disciples. This goes beyond efforts to ‘purify’ Islam by returning to its roots. Recently their radical doctrines have extended to opposing all ways of thinking that are not firmly rooted in fundamentalist Islam. The CSRC research clearly shows that the ideologies of this emergent radicalism are not those of moderate, majority Islam, as represented by Indonesia’s two major Islamic organizations, Nahdhatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah.
Indonesia is going through a process of national reformation, part of which includes wide religious freedom. These groups have taken advantage of this by acting independently of Indonesia’s established religious institutions, apparently without any hindrance from them or the state. Both Nahdhatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah are threatened by this, and have acted to nourish Islamic moderatism and protect it from radical groups. Nahdhatul Ulama’s stronghold is its mosques. In an attempt to protect these from infiltration, in 2007 it promulgated Bahtsul Masail PB NU, a statement urging a process of mosque certification. Muhammadiyah’s strength lies in its social and educational institutions, which include schools, orphanages, hospitals and universities. On December 1 of 2006 it published Surat Keputusan (Directive) No.149, as a measure to protect these institutions from infiltration by proselytizing groups or political parties intent on pushing radically divergent ideologies and agendas.
The research reported by this book sought to answer questions about the ideologies promoted by mosques in DKI Jakarta and Solo. It asked to what extent these remained those of moderate Islam, and examined the prevalence of more radical Islamic concepts. To do this it observed the teaching philosophies and practices of selected mosques, and enquired into the way mosque managers perceived five key indicator issues, namely governmental system: democracy or Khilafah Islamiyah; formalization of sharia law; jihad as martyrdom; gender equality, and pluralism. These are issues in which there is clear divergence between the moderate and the radical perspectives.
This research drew a number of significant conclusions about mosque teaching practices. It concluded that generally speaking the substance, nature and practices of mosque management in Jakarta and Solo are overtly transparent, open and above all moderate. Teaching by the use of standard religious texts remains the norm. The most commonly studied texts remain those of commentary and law, whose concepts are moderate.
This said, the studies found a developing trend towards more covert teachings, such as the school of thought represented by halaqah. This was particularly noticed in Muhammadiyah’s Kottabarat mosque in Solo. In a small number of cases radically inclined texts, such as the commentary Fi Dhilalil Qur’an, have also become reference texts for study. The researchers noted the presence of books and magazines of a radical nature in mosque libraries, such as the books of Sayyid Quthb and the magazines Sabili and Suara Hidayatullah. Moreover, the religious bulletin most widely distributed to mosques is al-Islam, published by Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia.
Minor variations aside, it is apparent that these radical Islamic groups are actively and systematically striving for an Islamic caliphate and an Islamic State. Heavy handed efforts to formally enact sharia law are part of this struggle. Their agenda and ideology do not shrink from using the way of jihad, violence in the name of religion and actions designed to inspire terror.
Their fundamentalist doctrines assert that both non-Muslims and women are second class citizens. Neither has the right, for example, to become Head of State, and they would invoke a religious prohibition against (mengharamkan) any such possibility. They are particularly intolerant of women’s rights. They seek to fetter these, and disapprove strongly of any female participation in the public arena.
It should be stressed that while adherents of these radical doctrines are growing in number, they remain a small minority within Indonesia’s Islamic community. The responses of most mosque managers to the five indicator issues listed above reflect moderate views. They are committed to a system of government which is firmly founded on the integrity of the State and the Unitary Republic of Indonesia (NKRI). Despite this, a small number of mosque managers support the concept of establishing an Islamic state and an Islamic caliphate.
Overall, these radical notions of the ideal (Islamic) Indonesian State should be noted with considerable concern. This book reports mosques which were adamant in their support for establishing a Khilafah Islamiyah—an Islamic caliphate which would abolish the democratic system of government. This response was not confined to mosque communities well known for their radical, exclusivist orientation, such as the al-Islam mosque in Gumuk and the al-Maghfiroh mosque. Similar responses came from the managers and communities of mosques generally seen as having a more open religious environment, such as the al-Muttaqien mosque in Kartopuran. Responses to the other indicator issues also represented a degree of acceptance of radical Islamic doctrines.
The book’s conclusion is that the while the majority of mosques in DKI Jakarta propound the concepts of moderate Islam, a small number preach radical Islamic doctrines. The situation is different in the ten mosques studied in Solo, a city known for its culture. The research found that, to a worrying extent, these mosques have been and currently are being used as vehicles for spreading radical Islamic ideas.
If the seeds of radical Islam planted in our mosques are allowed to grow, their harvest will be the death of moderate Islam in the motherland we love.